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The countries of Eastern Europe may be able to  In Eastern Europe and the USSR, the political
benefit from the lessons learned from structural  and administrative problems of introducing a new tax
adjustment in developing countries although bhe  two  system are formidable, but do not justify substituting
reform experiences differ in major ways.  For one  commodity taxes for a more modem fiscal system.
thing, markets were suppressed more in the formerly  The difficulties with the changeover to a new tax
socialist countries than in the developing countries.  system are transitional, rather than endemic, and
Distortions in the agricultural sector were more  delay in introducing more appropriate taxes will
,unassive,  and the urban bias was Iess - because large-  simply build new distortions into the reformed
scale subsidies allowed producer prices and earnings  economies.
to rise even though labor productivity was low.  *  The needs of vulnerable groups must be moni-
Four issues must be addressed to get the prices  tored and addressed. In developing countries, policy
nearly right:  reforms in agriculture often imply raising food prices
* A credible correction of the exchange rate must  to provide better incentives to producers. Eliminating
be achieved.  The intent of devaluating the exchange  food subsidies reduces urban income in relation to
rate is to increase the price of tradables relative to  rural income, because food prices must go up.  And
nontradables.  Devaluation will achieve its original  price reform can hurt vulnerable parts of the popula-
purpose only if there is political commitment - tion.  The challenge during the adjustment process is
manifested through fiscal discipline - to change the  to see that large sums of money targeted to help the
rural-urban distribution of income. If the govemment  poor are appropriately distributed to the needy.
offsets devaluation by spending that increases the  In this important look at what the reforming
in-ome of the urban sector, the result will be cost-  countries of Eastem Europe can (and cannot) learn
push inflation.  from the developing countries, Braverian  and
* Relative prices must be adjusted within the  Guasch discuss these and other issues involved in
agricultural sector.  The response to a uniform price  reforming prices; credit, financial institutions, and
shift and to changes in relative prices will be modest  marketing boards; property rights, land tenure, and
unless the instruments of bureaucratic intervention are  privatization; research, extension, and technology;
removed.  In the former socialist countries, price  and efforts to remediate environmental degradation.
reform and institutional change are linked: removing  A central dilemma in the reform of the Eastem
bureaucratic constraints on agents' decisions is  European economies is the tension between commit-
essential to price reforn.  ment and flexibility. Economic agents must believe
* The transmission mechanism that links domestic  that the govemment will play by the new rules and
to international prices and consumer to producer  will force others to do so too.  Yet the rules must
prices must be changed. Strengthening the momen-  occasionally change or be adjusted as circumstances
tum of the negotiations on trade liberalization is  change. Modem economic theory is of little help in
important to the long-term success of reform in  the art of merging flexibility with credibility. West-
Eastem Europe.  But removing relatively cheap  em technical assistance and international financial
subsidized imports will make it harder in the short run  help can be effecti-e only if professionals of the East
for these economies to meet the needs of their most  and West work together, as this is a process of joint
vulnerable consumers.  learning, not a pure transfer of knowledge.
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NTRODUCTION
Eastern European  countries  and the USSR  are embarking  on a breathtaking political and
economic transition.  They are  venturing  Into  uncharted economic territory  encumbered by
institutional riglditles, property rights dilemmas,  high external debt, nonconvertibe currencies, and
inadequate  safety  nets, all of which  pose severe problems  for  traditional macroeconomic  and price
reforms.  The move toward a market economy  has shocked the stagnant and deceptively stable
sociailst system, bringing unemployment  and Inflation.
The people of  these  countries,  however, are  not  the only  ones who are moving into
uncharted territory  --  so also are economists  usually designated  "Western",  I.e., those working In
the tradition of  economic  theory that  developed  unconstrained by strict  Marxist dogma. Modern
economic  theory offers  little  insight Into the dynamics  and Institutlon-building necessary to move
from a centrally-planned  to a market economy.  Our  Arrow-Debrela  paradigm  even in Its most modifled
version, aliows analysis of small  changes In a market economy. It assumes  the existence of well-
defined property  rlghts,  financial and marketing Institutions  and contingent markets.  In their
absence, our ability to  predict the knpact of  major reforms, such as freeing the price system Is
lknited.
The reform of  formerly centrally planned economies  Involves freeing  the  price system,
developing  a competitive  onvironment,  and  privatizing many  of the state-owned or controlled assets
and services, while sinmutaneously  generating the social, economic  and legal Infrastructure  that-2  -
undergirds a market economy. These processes require varying time dimensions  In an atmosphere
of  political uncertalnty.  Any ex ante analysis of  the transitlon  In Eastern Europe and the USSR
should therefore be approached  with the utmost humillty,  and  with the knowledge  that we have many
lessons yet  to learn as we expand  our theory to  comprehend  this phenotiienon.
The experience  of developed  and  developing  countrles offers  some  lessons relevant to the
transitlon.  In this  paper we focus  only on lessons relevant  to  the agricultural sector.  The
agricultural or rural sector In developing  countries Is Important. In  many  countries It Is still the main
engine  for growth and  a major  contributor to foreign exchange. The  rural sector engages  between
50 percent and 80  percent of  labor In most developing  countries and contributes more than a
quarter of GDP.  Most  of the poor In developing  countries still reside In rural areas. Agriculture has
traditionally been subject to discriminatory  practices, through  exchange  rate, price, and  tax policies
known  together as the urban bias.
Many  developing  countries have attempted to remedy  the problems  caused  by the urban bias
plus the budget deficit, balance  of  payments  problems,  and  massive  external debt by embarking  on
the so-called process of  structural  adjustment.  In response, Internatlonal financial Institutions,
In  particular The  World  Bank,  have  generated  a new  lending  mechanism,  the structural adjustment  ioan
conditioned  on various policy reforms.  We  prefer  to view these loans In a broader context, since
structural adjustment should  be seen as a process of ongoing policy reform.  The areas of  reform
Include  monetary  and fiscal policies, exchange  rate and domestic  price reforms, Institutional reform
(especially In areas of  credit, marketing boards and land and property  rights),  and policies to
Improve  technoiogy transfer  and adaptatlon.  In addition, special attention  has been given to-3-
programs to  protect  the poor, with an InsuffI,lent  degree of  success.  Adequate Investment In
physical  and  human  Infrastructure, Including  health,  education, and  nutritlon, Is critical to supplement
structural adjustment  programs,  and  these Investments  have  a high  payoff, particulariy for the poor.
The process of reform In developing  countries differs from that In Eastern Furope and the
USSR,  since the physical  Infrastructure,  human  capital, and cultural context that comprlse  the Initlal
conditlons differ.  The differences limit the degree to which the LDC  experlenco 9nOralizes  tho
Eastern Europe and the USSR.  The suppression cf  markets In the former socialist countries  Is
greater than In the LDCs.  The distortions within  the agricultural sector are more  massive,  and more
difficult  to measure  without meaningful  prices and exchange  rates.  The  urban blas In aggregate has
been less In the post-Stalinist perlod than Is the case In LDCs,  because subsidization on a large
scaie through the state budget and the banking  system  has allowed  producer prices and earnings
to rise even though labor productivity Is low. The  urban bias  In several countrles, most notably the
USSR,  has Increased In the transitlonal period as controlled producer prices have fallen behind
Increases  In the general  price level.  The bias Is still less than In many  LDCs  however,  and the large
subsidies of  recent  years affect  rural  people's evaluatlon of  the gains and losses that  the
transition will  bring.  The Implications  of  these differences In Initial conditlons for  the two types of
policy reform:  structural  adjustment In developing  countries  and transitlon  to  post  collectivist
market oriented agriculture will be discussed below.
GETTING  THE  PRICES  NEARLY  RIGHT
Four Issues usually must be addressed In an effort  to  get the prices nearly right:  I) a
credible  corretion  of  the exchange  rate must be achieved;  11)  relative prices within the agricultwual-4-
sector must to  adjusted; 111)  the transmission  mechanism  that links domestic  to International prices
and consumer  to  producer prices must be changed;  Iv) the needs of  vulnerable groups must be
monitored  and addressed.
Achloving  A Credible Devaluatlon
The  Intent of devalulng  the exchange  rate le to Ir,crease  tL.e  relative price of  tradables  with
respect to  nontradables. Given  tie  prevalence  of  urban blas, this tends to  wcrease agricuRural
producer prices at the expense  of Incomes  of urban residents. One  clear les-on on devaluation  that
has been learned Is that  devaluation will only achieve Its  original purpose if  there  Is political
commitment,  manifested through fiscal discip!lie, to change the rural-urban Income  distribution.  If
the government offsets  the devaluation  by expenditure that  Increases the Income  of  the urban
rsctor,  particularly the government  sector, the results will  be t:ie nullification of  the devaluation,
and generation of  cost-push  Inflation (see Braverman  and Kanbur [1987]  for  an example  In an
African context).
The kIportance  of  Relative  Price Changes
A uniform  price shift, such as that which  takes place  In devaluatlon,  Is Inportant, particuarly
when  urban bias Is great.  In both developing  countries and the former socialist countries, however,
change In relative agricultural prices can be more Important,  since the distortions In these prices
are quite hlgh. Moreover, when  the aggregate supply elasticity of  output  and employment  In the
agricultural sector  Is  low, the  response to  a  uniform shift  In prices,  as  Is  achleved through
devaluatlon  alone,  may  bring modest  welfare  gains. The  greater Impact  on the budget deficit, forolgn
exchange,  and  on the distributlon of Income  derives from response  to adjustment In relative prices-5-
of key commoditles.  In  addition,  since the aggregate response  has very high  own  and cross effects,
the  costs  of  Inappropriate relative  prices  within agriculture  are  high, and the  welfare  gains
correspondingly great.  In assessing price reform which Involves tradooffs,  we empirically  use
estknated  elasticitles, and the newly-reformed  centrally-planned  eccnomles  present a real dilemma.
We  do not have price series that are meaningful  for  the ganeration of  these elasticities.  We  are
forced,  as  Is  the  case  In  analysis of  many data-poor  developing countries,  to  resort  to
guesstknatos  and Judgment.
In the case of Eastern Europe  and the USSR,  exchange  rates have historically been grossly
overvalued, but their  knpact on resource use has been muted by bureaucratic restrictions  and
hidden Interventions.  Devaluation  Is essential, but the response to a uniform price shift and to
changes  In relative pricos will  be  modest  unless  the Instruments  of bureaucratic Intervention are also
removed. Much  of the gain from price reform (both devaluation  and  ges In relative prices within
the agricultural sector)  will come  from removal  of  distortions  In regional comparative  advantage
achieved through price bonuses and assignment  of quotas.  In the former socialist countries, the
removal  of direct bureaucratic constraints on agents' decisions Is an Integral part of  successful
price reform; price reform and Institutlonal change are linked.  In LDCs  the potential direct  kmpact
of  remedlatlon  of price distortions Is greater, although  there, too, institutional changes  promoting
competitive  behavior, such as the removal  of monopolistic  marketing  and procurement  boards, are
essential.-6-
Producer Prices, Consumer  Prices, and Internatlonal Prices
The usual  prescription  for  price  reform has  been  to  move domestic prices  toward
International  prices.  Many people questlon  this  remedy, sinco  world prices  are  distorted.
International prices  for  agricultural commoditles  are  low In part  due to  the  subsidization of
agricultural producers In the EEC,  the United  States, and Japan. These  price subsidies  stand In the
way  of  shifting comparative  advantage In agriculture toward the developing  countries.  Moreover,
current price support policies In all countries provide Income  transfers  skewed  toward large more
commercial  farms,  and they encourage  Inefficient use of Inputs, such  as fertilizers, thus contributing
to enviroiinental dogradatlon.
East European  and  Soviet producers also suffer  from these policies  of developed  countries.
A breakthrough In the GATT  negotiatlons  through reductlon of  subsidles  and  quotas will  knprove the
lot  of  thelr agricultural sectors.  Therefore strengthening the momentum  of  the negotiations on
trade liberalization Is very Important  to  the long run success of  the reform process In Eastern
Europe. The removal  of  relatively cheap subsidized  imports, however, will  oxacerbate in the short
run  the  difficultles  of  economles  In transitlon  In meeting the  needs of  their  most vulnerable
consumers.
Whatever  the outcome  of trade negotiations,  small  countries have  to taka International  prices
as  determined by  world markets,  and policy  reform  should direct  domestlc prices  towards
International prices.  This does not Imply,  though, a dogma  of  Immediate  equalization of domestic
prices with International prices.  Rather we advocate assessment  of  tradeoffs  Involved In price
reform In  terms of government  revenue, foreign exchange,  and  the real Incomes  of different groups.- 7 -
The reality of  LDCs  often  implies  a llmited  set  of  Instruments  for  ralsing revenue and Influencing
Income  distribution, and therefore price reform must on occas*n  address conflicting objectives.
More specifically,  domestic  prices may  diverge from International  prices for several reasons:
First, when a country  exerts market power over  international prices, the need to  use marginal
revenue translates Into the need for an optimal  tariff  [tax].  This special  case appiles to very few
countries  and a  few prkmary  commodities  and often  the  degree of  market power of  individual
countries Is overstated.  This argument  is Irrelevant to the small  countries of Eastern Europe,  but
may  have some  relevance to Soviet wheat  Imports,  or eventual exports.  Second,  the presence of
significant price volatility  might force  the government to  deviate from the full  transmission of
International prices to  the domestic economy. Maintaining  stable prices has Importance  for  the
macroeconomy  by reducing the Impetus  for  cost-push Inflation and swings  In government  revenue
and forelgn  exchange. Moreover,  price stubIlizatlon can protect  the very poor from transitory
movements  In  real income  below  subsistence level. The  macroeconomic  consequences  and protectioi
of the very poor are probably  more Important  than some  of the microeconomic  consideratlons which
have received most of  the attention of research .;-i  the economics  of price stabilization up to now
(Newbery  and  Stlglitz [1981], Kanbur  [1984], Braverman,  Kanbur,  et al [1990]).  The  third justification
for  price intervention Involves subsidies of  Industrial countries.  A developing  country  facing a
reduction In world prices due to subsidles  or other factors may  be reluctant to pass these prices
on to farmers If the reductions are deemed  temporary. The  motive  Is to avold  the adjustment  costs
of  moving  out  of  an activity  with expectatlons of  returning to It later.  Supporting prices during
periods of transitory  decline  may  be justifled to malntain  production and empioyment  In agriculture,-8-
but only If there Is a strong consensus that the decline  Is transitory and the adjustment  costs are
high enough. Although  price stabilizatlon programs  have often  been costly and Inefficient due to
their misuse,  the concept cannot be brushed complately  aside.  There Is a need to  look for  an
approprlate mechanism  for  Income  !nsurance  and/or  price stabilization devised In more effective
ways.  Given the  absence of  risK Insurance markets together  with producers' and consumers'
Inexperlence  In  managing  risk, the costs of variability may  be higher  In the transition.  Therefore this
Issue should be reopened.  Fourth, political and administrative  problems  may  make  Income  tax and
other broadbased  taxes knpractical, particularly In  some  poor developing  countries.  The government
thus has difficulty raising revenues  to flnance  essentla3  public  expenditures,  e.g., for Infrastructure
and poverty alleviatlon.  In Eastern Europe and the USSR  the political and admWstrative  problems
assoclated with Introductlon of a new  tax system are formidable,  but do not Justify the substitution
of commodity  taxes for a more  modern  fiscal system. The difficulties with the change-over to a new
tax system are transitional, rather than endemic,  and  delay In the Introduction of more appropriate
taxation will  simply  build new  distortions Into the reformed economies.
Protecting the Vulnerable
In developing countries, policy reforms In agriculture often  Imply  ralsing food  prices to
provide better Incentives to producers. Eliminating  fooc  ,bsidles  reduces urban Income  In  relation
to rural Income,  because food prices go up.  These  changes  require political will  because the urban
sector  Is much  more polltically sens!tive and influential than the  rural sector.  They r&lse the
distrlbutlonal Issue of  how  price reform adversely affects  vulnerable  segments  of  the population.
In Eastern Europe, the same  problems  can occur, as the recent severe Increases In food prices In-9  -
Poland  have demonstrated. Several  Important  differences between  Eastern EU  ape and developing
countries should  be noted, however. In  the former, basic nutritlonal needs have been  met  In  general,
and  expectations and standards  of living are higher  than  In  many  developing  countries.  The changes
In Eastern Europe, however, are  of  tremendous magnitude; economies  that  have kncwn,  little
unemployment  will  experlence  a great deal of Joblessness.  Many  real wage  earners are experiencing
declines  In thelr real Income  due to  Increasing  prices.  The decline of  real wages Is exaggerated,
since during the perlcd of low prices many  consumers  experienced  quantity rationing and resorted
to black or free market purchases  at higher prices.  Safety nets such as social security have yet
to be created.  Agricultural employment  Is proportionately less than In most LDCs,  and changing  the
rural-urban terms of  trade may  thus adversely affect  a large number  of  people In urban areas.
Despite the  differencos  In their  circumstances, the experience of  poorer segments of
society In developing  countries Is relevant to that of  Easterrn  Europe. In LDCs  higher food prices
hurt the urban poor, landless  farmers, and small  farmers wlth a negative marketed  surplus, at least
In the short run. To protect these vulnerable  groups during the adjustment,  targeted programs  are
desirable  and have been knplemented. The track record for such programs  In developing  countries
durlng the last 20 years has not been very good, however. They should be advocated only when
the appropriate political will and administrative capacity exists In order  to  avoid corruptlon and
mismanagament  of resources. Otherwise,  It Is still advisable  to resort to subsidization  of commodities
that  the poor slgnificantly consume  much  more than do the rich (that  Is, inferlor  goods).  The
financing and  Inplomentatlon  of large safety nets during  the adjustment  process of the Eastern bloc
will require large  amounts of  capital transfer  from the  Western world, Including International- 10 -
organizatlons. The challenge  will  be to design,  monitor and Implement  these programs  to guarantee
that  large sums of  money will be appropriately distributed to  the  needy population during the
transition.
INSTITUTIONS
Credible price reform can  achieve the  desired price response only If  supplemented  by
Institutional reform to  provide for  well-defined property  rights, easy access to  capital Inputs,
financial institutlons that distrlbute credit effectively,  and competitive  marketing  boards that allow
producers rather than Institutlons to retain rents.  There Is also a need for a coherent policy on
research and development  to I iduce Innovations  and  to diffuse technical  knowledge  and  Informatlon
through extenslon services.  Without  such policies the potential gains of price reform probably  will
not be realized  (Chhlbber  [1989]).  Crops  have to reach markets  quickly and  only farmers  with access
to credit will choose the right mix  of  Inputs or exert the right amount  of effort.  The provision of
public goods, like water and lrrigatlon systems, as well as extenslon services, can be a most
effective  way to  Increase yields:  but one can hardly expect Individual  farmers to  Invest much  In
them.  The evidence suggests, however,  that many  countrles, particularly low Income  Subsaharan
African economies,  have seen the efficacy of price reforms undermined  by the presence  of severe
Infrastructural  constraints  and marcet rigidities.  In consequence,  many structural  adjustment
programs  should  have policy components  addressing those Issues.
Credit, Flnancial  Institutions, and Marketing  Boards
Improved  access to credit In LDCs  was Intended  as a major policy Instrument  to accelerate
development  In the rural areas and to  Improve  the Income  distribution between rural  and urban- 11  -
residents.  In additlon, It  was advocated as  a  second best  remedy to  counter  the  common
discrnlination agalnst agriculture through the urban bias In tax, price, and exchange  rate policles.
The record of  companlon  policies to  price reform, particularly on credit and Institution
building, Is disappointing.  Over the past  30 years, massive  amounts of  credit,  most often  at
subsidized  Interest rates, have been channeled  to rural sectors In developing  countries.  But more
often than not, those subsidies  have benefitted the wealthier  and Influential farmers. Llttle formal
credit reached  the small  farmers. Also, many  institutions created to support the agricultural sector,
In particular formal credit Institutions, suffer  from inefficiency and Ineptitude, engage In arbitrary
practices, and lack financial viability (Adams  [1971],  von Pischke, Adams  and Donald  [1983],  and
Braverman  and Guasch  L1990]).
The abovementloned  shortcomings  In performance  of  financial institutions, however,  could
easily apply  to the developed  countries.  The  Savings  & Loan  crisis In  the United  States wIll  probably
end up costing $250 to $500 bililon,  an amount  that dwarfs the obligations of  even the most debt
ridden LDCs. The creation of  long term accountability In financial Institutions Is becoming  a global
Issue. Eastern Europe  must  learn from the failure of Incentives  In many  financial institutions In LDCs
and  the  developed world,  and  build  credible mechanisms  for  monitoring, enforcement,  and
accountability.  Banks In the socialist system were essentially agencies  for  transmission  of  funds,
and fulfilled few of  the functions of  full  financial Institutions  In a market economy. Therefore,
technical  assistance from developed  countries will  be necessary In order to develop  basic skills In
the technology  of banking,  accounting  practices, and  generation of financial Instruments. Financial
institutions must be created Immediately,  for without them,  a market system cannot function.-12  -
The needed  Institutional changes  go beyond  the financial  sector, and,  as argued  above, are
critical  In the area of  marketing.  Reforms In marketing  boards and procurement agencles are
urgently needed to promote  competition,  since many  of these organizations  exhibit monopoly  power
and overly tax the farmer.  Their noncompetitive  behavior  reduces farmers' supply response and
Inhlbits  Improvement  In the rural sector.  Experience  In  developing  countries has shown  that attempts
to Interfere directly with  supply  through  ratloning, licensing,  targeting and  other direct controls have
been open to  abuse. At best, the attempts breed inefficiency.  At worst, they Increase  monopoly
power, Increase Inequality, and encourage corruption.  The key characteristics to strive  for  are
accountability,  non-interference,  and  responsiveness to  market  forces  which will generate
competitive  behavior.
Property Rights,  Land  Tenure, and Privatization
Structural adjustment  policies  often  Involve  reassessing  property and land rights as well  as
titling the land. A major Issue here Is whether and  how  the absence  or ambiguous  definition of  land
rights harm  agricultural productivity.  One  usual line  of reasoning  Is that when  land  or property rights
are not well  defined, farmers are reluctant to sink fixed (irreversible) Investment  or to make  long-
term Investments  In their land, even though doing so Is socially efficient.  Another Is that farmers
access to credit Is hampered,  since their land Is not accepted as collateral.
Evidence  of  the reality of these links Is ample. For example  Feder's t1990] case study on
Thailand  shows  that the lack of land title prevents small  farmers from access to credit and Induces
underinvestment  of  capital. The policy implicatlon  Is that property rights should  be fuly  exclusive,
transferable, alienable,  and enforceable to facilitate  the development  of  an active land or rights- 13 -
market. Property rights or long term land use rights with  these characterlstics Induce  efficlent and
higher levels of labor and management,  as well  as greater Investments  to enhance  land yields. This
point Is very kmportant In the East European  and Sovlet context, since these countries enter the
transitional  period  with  a  strong  Ideological bias  against  fully  functloning  markets In  land.
Restrictions on land markets will constraln the extent to which reform In the financial sector can
move  forward, since the state will be forced to retain an active role In agricultural lending  (Brooks
[1 990]).
A point to  consider In the land privatization process Is what should be the level of  land
fragmentation. Of course, that could be left  ex post to the market to resolve, but that could take
years and large transaction costs  to bring the desired changes. An argument  for  maintaining  the
current size, where the average farm size Is over 1500 hectares, except In Poland,  Is that It would
allow for  the reaping of  the existent and significant economies  of  scale In agricultural activities,
givvl  ig those countries an advantage  over the countless smaliholdings  of the EC,  provided that the
managerial  and agency Incentive problems  are accounted for.
The developing  countries offer  few lessons  on the particular Issues of farm reorganization
and privatizatlon of  land  relevant to Eastern Europe  and the USSR  simply  because few collectivized
on the scale of  the  socialist countries.  The available lessons lie mostly In the successes and
failures of  the Chinese  and Israeli experiences,  but the generalizations are lknited. In China  price
reform and  division  of the land  (albeit suboptimally)  brought an Immediate  supply  response due In  part
to a divisible technology amenable  to small  scale production. The  Chinese  experience  suggests that
uncertainty as to the duration and  renewability  of the land  contract llmits  Investment  and constrains- 14 -
long  term growth (Lin  [19903).  The Israeli  experience  with long term  marketable  contracts  In  land  also
offers  some lessons  (Zusman  [1988], and Klslev, Lerman  and Zusman  [19903).  In Israel long term
leasing  of land has provided  security of tenure adequate  for Investment  and producers have Jointly
contracted for  use of nondivisible  technology. The Israeli agricultural sector,  however,  has been
plagued  by financial overextension, due to the exlsting uniknited  joint liability both among  members
and among  cooperatives that lead to  significant "free-riding".
In additlon to  land reform, the privatization of  agrarian enterprises Is at the core of  the
agricultural reform In Eastern Europe. When,  where, and how  to privatize these organIzations, and
how to  structure  efficiency  and fair  access Into the process present dilemmas  for  the former
socialist countrles that  the LDC  experience does little  to  elucidate.  The public sector  In most
developing  countries Is of course proportionately smaller  than In Eastern Europe. Many  developing
countries established  state enterprises with the Intention to  correct  market failures and Inprove
Income distributlon.  Although some state  enterprises, like  the Kenyan Tea Authority  and the
Botswana  Meat Commission,  are relatively well run, many  public enterprlses In developing  countries
and throughout Eastern Europe  and the USSR  are statutory  monopolles,  or are given advantages
over private concerns through open or Indirect subsidies. In addition, they often  lack competitive
or fiscal discipline  as they perceive themselves  --  unfortunately rightly so --  as being subject to
soft  budget constraints (Kornal [1980]).  The  absence  of financlal discipline  shelters their survival
and riddles them with Inefficiencies and Inaqulties.  Some  developing  countries have In response
moved  haltingly toward the privatizatlon of  large state  complexes. The results of  their cautious- 15 -
approach have been mixed. In Malaysia  and Togo, selective privatization has been vigorous, but
these countries have  been the exceptlons  despite widespread  disenchantment  with  the pubilc  sector.
The efficiency argument  for privatization or divestiture emphasizes  the potentlal benefit to
the consumer from iower production costs.  Those benefits  can be reaped and passed to  the
consumers  only If there Is a competitive  environment  and a supporting Infrastructure.  Privatization
In Itself will not bring competitlon  and Improved  performance. In Poland,  despite much  privatization
In agricultural production, systemic  and  Institutional Impediments  In extension, credits, Input supply,
and  marketing  depress agricultural productivity.  Noncompetitive  behavior  In  marketing  prevents the
private sector  from benefitting  from the  superior Incentives of  private ownership.  Moreover,
transferring monopoly  power  from a public  enterprise to a private one will  transfer value added  from
one privileged group to another (or sometimes  to the same  people In larger amountsi),  but will  have
ambiguous  net kIpact  on consumers  and on total factor  productivity.
ThA  question of  how and when  to  privatize Is a complex  one.  The conditlons under which
privatization can fully  Implement  the soclal objectives of  equity and efficiency  are restrictive.
Economic  theory convincingly  argues for the allocative  superiority of competition,  but It Is much  less
forceful,  If  not  ambiguous,  about the  superiority  of  private  ownership.  There Is  a cost  to
privatization, as we have learned through the principal  agent literature.  In providing  Incentives, the
goverrment receives less than the expected  discounted  value  of enterprise profits, because  of risk
aversion, informatlonal  constraints, and capital restrictions.  Moreover, some  objectives might be
very difficult  to obtain In the course of privatizatlon, like the rlght risk-taking, the socially optimal
Innovation,  and  the equitable  divislon  of capital, particularly In these socletles where  over 40 years- 16-
of  collctivizatlon have significantly undermined  the psychological  prerequisites  for  private
undertakings.
The  appropriate  balance  between  the public  and  private sectors hinges  on establishig who
has  a comparative  advantage  In the productive  or service  activity.  If measures  can be taken  to
ensure a competitive  environment  --  a large determinant  of efficlency  --  It would  be foollsh to clahk
that no government  Interventlon  could knprove welfare. Opening  formerly  closed seonomels to
foreign competition  can Induce competitive  behavior even If  the domestic  Industry remains
concentr  .ted.
Given  the severity  of the price  and  market  distortions  affecting  Eastem  European  countries,
It Is difficult to determine  ex ante which  state enterprises  would  perform  effectively under  a bona
fIde market  system  and  which  would  not.  The  Issue  of privatizatlon  Illustrates  our need  for humillty
--  If we  could  distingulsh  the  viable  from  the nonviable  enterprises,  which  should  be  privatized?  The
bankrupt  ones,  trading  fiscal solvency  for hlgher  unemployment?  Or  the potentially  profitable  ones,
releasing  profits where  they can  grow  under  better Incentives,  and  retalning  weak  firms  under  the
shelter of  the state's portfolio?  If It Is possible  to harden  the budget  constraint and change
managerial  Incentives,  privatization  may  not be necessary. The  credibillty  of the commitment  to a
hard  budget  constralnt Is difficult to promote,  however  (Brooks  [1990]).
Equlty  and  fairness  are key  Issues  In the  privatization  debate,  and  must  be  considered  along
with  efficlency. We  have  learned  from  developing  countries  that severe  Inequitles  can  result  on two
fronts.  Firstly, equity  will suffer If small,  powerful  groups  within  the society are allowed  to gain
ownership  of large  amounts  of property. Conversely,  East  Europeans  and  Soviets  now  face the rare-17  -
opportunity  to put In place  a relatively  equitable  distrlbution  of agricultural  assets and  wealth  that
minknizes  the need  for costly contractual  negotiatlons  and can  serve as a foundation  for future
growth  (Stigiltz  t19903).  Secondly,  a situatIon  In which  the prices  of capital  are much  lower  than  the
actual market  valuation  can result In the Inappropriate  large transfers to foreign Interests with
greater access  to capital. Even  If valuation  Is correct, wealth  will  pass  to foreigners  If domestic
citizens  have  poor access  to Internatlonal  capital  markets.
The  distribution  of the gains  from  privatization  within  the  country  depends  on  the distribution
of  Information  and access  to capital  markets,  which  often privileges  people  well  placed  In the old
order. Valuation  also critically  affects the distributlon  of gains. Care  should  be exercised  to avoid
"spontaneous  privatization",  or the illcit or unfair capture  of sale proceeds  or asset value  by the
former  managerial  class.  Denying  ownership  to former managers,  however,  elhuinates  a class of
people  who  presumably  are relatively  better trained  to run  the enterprise. If the enterprise  can  be
fairly valued,  the problems  of spontan3ous  privatization  are reduced,  but not elkninated.
Research,  Extenslon  and  Technology
Much  agricultural  growth  can  come  from  new  technologles.  Research  generates  Innovatlons,
and extension  brings  them  to the fleld. Research  and  extension  are public  goods,  and  the private
sector alone  will  underinvest  In them  without  government  Intervention. Most  developing  countries
have  neglected  agricultural  research,  as Is exemplified  by the lack of  government  commitment  to
research,  budget  cuts and  a low  level  of funding  for operational  expenses.  Research  and  extension
expenditures  have barely exceeded  one percent of  the value of  agricultural  product In most
developing  countries,  whereas  three  times  as much  Is  allocated  in the Industrial  countrles,  where  the- 18 -
relative knportance  of agriculture In the natlonal economy  Is lower. Perhaps  the shortage of tralned
sclentific arid technical staff,  and the difficulties  In measurlng  positive returns  In extension and
research iivestments In the short run have been some  of  the causes.  The developing  world has
consiste itly  shown  lack of a coherent strategy, the lack of a review of the status of research for
each agro-ecological zone, and the lack of an evaluation of the expected  net gains from research.
The most common  type of  research has been applied  or adaptive.  It Is iess costly, more
oriented to quick results, and essential, because  research developed  elsewhere  cannot be directly
transferred  without some adaption to  local conditions.  But  even where successful  research
programs  have been developed, problems  have occurred In the dissemination  of  those advances.
Research  and extension services have not always  been linked.
East Europeans  and Sovlets can learn from the shortcomings  In research and extension in
the developing  world, but  they can learn the same lessons from the poor returns  to  their own,
larger, investments In agricultural research.  Satisfactory links depend  on cooperative attitudes
among  the sclentist, the extension worker, and the farmer. Reglonal  committees,  Joint  onfarm  trlals,
having research workers function  as  subject matter specialists, running periodical in-the-fleld
training sessions can all help In strengthening these links.
The experience  of  agricultural research and technology transfer  In the developing  world Is
not one of uniform falure.  There have been  significant successes, as well, and  many  of these have
been achieved  In coordinated Internatlonal  efforts  that link participants from many  countries of the
developed  and  developing  world. Llnkages  wlth  the International  sclentific community  can be  expected- 19 -
to  have a higher payoff In Eastern Europe and the USSR  than In the deveioping  world because the
initlal Investment  In basic sclentific knowledge  Is hlgher.
The Environment
Environmental  degradation Is one of the more  ominous  problems  facing Eastern Europe and
the USSR,  and In this area the experience  of  LDCs  offers  an kiportant cautlonary note to  temper
the enthusiastic rush toward markets In the former socialist countries.  in deveioping  countries, a
focus  on growth without careful consideration of  the  iong-term consequences has resulted  in
pollution,  erosion,  and  consumption of  nonrenewable resources.  The  classic  problems of
externalitles have made  markets myopic  wlth regard to the needs of  future  generations and very
hard on the  onvironment.  Given the  Inherited environmental degradation, the  former socialist
economies  cannot afford  lelsurely lessons  In environmental  prctection.  Technical  assistance will  be
necessary in order  to  find w  is  drastically to reduce industrial pollution, deforestation  and soil
degradation.
The severity of the onvironmental  degradation  associated  with market  oriented growth raises
an kmportant question:  Should  the wealthier  countrles subsidize  poorer nations to encourage them
to choose an onvironmentally  more  responsible  path? This question arises more concretely when  a
wealthy neighbor provides tied  assistance to  a poorer neighbor, with the objective of  reducing
transboundary pollution.  In both cases Instruments  must be created to transmit the incentive to
cease pollution to  the  agents actually engaged In environmentally  destructive  behavior.  This
involves creation of  Instruments  such as marketable  pollution permits, but  these will achleve the
desired effect  only If indirect effects  on employment  are included,  as well.- 20  -
CONCLUSIONS
The transition  to  post collectivlst agriculture presents unprecedented  opportunities and
dilemmas.  The experience  of developing  countries has much  relevance  for  the countries of Eastern
Europe and the USSR,  but unfortunately It offers  no magic  formulas  or guaranted  solutions.  The
scope of  change Is greater  than that  attempted In the structural  adjustment programs  of  the
developing world, and, because of  Its  comprehensiveness,  the  potential  that  the parts  will fit
together Is greater.  The dilemmas  and pitfalls are correspondingly  large.  A centra'  I  s the
tension between commitment  and flexibility.  Economic  agents must believe that the goverrvnont  will
and will force  others  to  play by the new rules.  Yet the rules must occasionally be changed  or
adjusted as Ignorance clears or circumstances  adjust.  The merger of  flexibillty with crediblllty Is
Indeed  an art.
In this process of artistic  sclence, modern  economic  theory Is of  lkuited  help. Rarely have
economists encountered the  kind of  consclously undertaken, sweeping  changes that  Eastem
European  societies and the USSR  have proposed Including  the creation of  new legal, polltical and
social Infrastructures.  Western technical assistance with the  support of  International fhanclal
Institutions can be effective  only If professlonals of the East and West work together, since this
Is a process of  joint learning,  not a pure transfer of  knowledge.- 21  -
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